(urth) 5HC : Skinner, Turing (fwd)

[Iorwerth Thomas]

>From: maru <marudubshinki at gmail.com>
>
>Consider that every situation can be broken down to a binary choice (you 
>never are forced to take three-at-a-time; this is possible, there are 
>several election procedures which would work under such circumstances.) 
>Further consider that there is always a better choice, a choice that 
>however infintesmially better it might fulfill your desires, is none the 
>less at least a little better than the other, so you always can choose if 
>you think about it.  Another way of putting it is you are never in a states 
>of complete ignorance where you might as well flip a coin.  Now, choices 
>are always made according to desires, and expectations about those, whether 
>those desires be apparently irrational or masochistic, they are desires 
>nonetheless.  So in all these situations you break down your choices to 
>whatever of the two satisfies your desires best. Which means that your 
>choice, to someone who knows you well enough (where 'well enough' ranges 
>from a good friend, to requiring a vast scientific enterprise's knowledge), 
>are predictable. Which means you are deterministic. But wait! What if you 
>disagree? What if you think that we don't always follow what we see as in 
>the best interests of our desires? Well then, that means some of the time 
>you will be choosing against one's interests and desires, and by definition 
>that's bad! So you are confronted with a di-lemna: Either you are a slave 
>to your desires, and free will is an incoherent, but comforting illusion; 
>or you are doomed to unhappiness, when you 'freely' choose against what 
>really matters to youy, what makes you happy.
>Nice bilemna eh?
>
Pretty good.  Here's a possible counterexample (original to a Calvinist 
cognitive scientist by the name of Donald Mackie - or Mackay; I forget which 
- via John Barrow's nice little book 'Impossibility').

Let's assume all of the above, plus the not unreasonable - given our present 
state of knowledge - that these desires correlate with brain states. Let's 
also (just for fun) assume that the laws of the universe are completely 
deterministic - no quantum mechanics - and reductionist - all is controlled 
by the laws of physics with no emergence.  None of these additional 
assumptions appear to be necessary for this argument, they merely point out 
how strong it is.

In this hypothetical universe, I have indulged in a little black magic and 
conjured Laplace's Demon, the bodiless, ominescient intelligence which can 
predict the actions of everything in the universe.  I have asked you what 
you wish to have for lunch tomorrow.  I am told that you will, given your 
brain state now, have a cheese sandwich for lunch tomorrow.

Fine.  If I wait and watch, I will see you eating a cheese sandwich 
tomorrow.  But what if (loony sorcerer that I am) I _tell_ you what you are 
going to have to eat tomorrow as soon as I aquire the information?

It transpires that I change your brain state from a) not knowing what I was 
going to eat tomorrow to b)knowing what I am going to eat tomorrow.  This 
throws the prediction a little out of whack, so I rush back to my summoning 
circle and ask the Demon for a new prediction concerning your actions given 
your present brain state of b).  Which he does.

Enthused, I run back to you and tell you what you are going to eat tomorrow 
and thus change your brain stait to c) knowing what I'm going to eat 
tomorrow given I have brain state b).  Which throws the prediction out of 
whack, so I run back to the Demon and....  etc.

I can't tell you what you're going to do (even if I have perfect knowledge 
of it) without no possibility of changing what you will do, which removes 
some of the sting from physical determinism.  Replace 'brain states' with 
the 'my desires' and, assuming that you're responsive to the environment 
your desires might well change when you're told what you're going to do 
(particularly if you tend to desire the frustration of arrogant black 
magicians who wish to predict the future!).

There are almost certainly a lot of problems with this story, but I'm fond 
of it.

Iorwerth