(urth) 5HC : Skinner, Turing, Laplace

maru marudubshinki at gmail.com
Sat Mar 19 23:29:57 PST 2005


James Wynn wrote:

>Basically, it does not take into account an Einstienian view of the universe
>in which time itself is dimension just like space. (and how could Laplace
>have known about that?)
>
>If the demon is truely outside the universe, then he can see time from its
>start to its termination as easily as it can see all things operating within
>the universe. This means the that universe does not have to be deterministic
>for him to accurately predict the future: he has only to see what happened
>after the choices are made rather than "predicted" based on any particular
>"state" of the universe.
>
>This is why I think the "computer" was a better idea than a demon sitting
>outside the universe. A conventional computer can (theoretically) be equiped
>with enough back-up monitoring measures to be reliably constantly aware of
>the "state" of its own processes because it is not as complex as a demon.
>
>The primary point of a computer was merely that if you had all the
>information at your desposal you could predict any final result. But has not
>chaos theory suggested this is impossible? Hasn't it accepted that the
>interactions of 3 or 4 bodies on each other, let alone a cloud of bodies
>cannot be predicted for any ONE of those bodies --  that you can can only
>predict the actions of the group?
>
>Granted 3 or 4 asteroids orbiting each other do not have free will, but the
>computer thought-experiment presumes rational creatures ARE deterministic.
>It presumes that if you had a computer that had all the information on the
>universe's current state available to it, it's predictions would be
>accurate. But what if it weren't? It might be free will or it might be a
> demon from outside the universe influencing bodies. So you could annex the
>demon into the universe (and all things influencing that demon in it's own
>metaverse), but what if the computer's predictions were still inaccurate?
>This thought experiement doesn't suggest the outcome in any way.
>
>Heck, if vibrating molecules are not deterministic, why should humans be? I
>have made random choices about big decisions in my life. Perhaps over time
>you can decide the odds of my decision for a particular random choice and
>even the general flow my inclinations in my random choices over time, but I
>do not see how any computer could reliably determine my particular choices
>at any time, and so it will not know the state of the universe for future
>choices (ad infinitum).
>
>~ Crush
>  
>
I think the proofs for the n-body and 3-body orbital mechanics
problems actually stated that you'd need infinite processing power
to solve them exactly.  Which we can postulate a computer sitting out
side the universe having. And also one of the primary discoveries of chaos
theory was how quickly processes spread out amongst the lagrange space
and thusly how sensitive to the precision of initial information.  It is 
more
an engineering result, not a true limitative result like Godel, or 
Schrodinger.
But also remember the emulation principle, and remember also  the fact
that even 'chaotic'  systems are deterministic; run the equation with 
the same
seed, get the same answer.

~Maru



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