(urth) (no subject)

maru marudubshinki at gmail.com
Thu Jan 27 15:04:05 PST 2005

To which the hoary old Oriental Sun-Tzu replies: 'To win without 
winning; that could be called a win.'  Not needing to use a tool is the 
highest use tools.  Or, Not-use is not the same as not using.
And as far as Searle goes, I think he falls into the trap of the 
No-true-Scotsman fallacy: But he talks like a Scot, eats like a Scot, 
looks like one what with the kilt and hair, his parents and 
grand-parents were Scots...' 'Bah! He's no true Scotsman.'  Which is to 
say, he practically says that intelligence is something that biologicals 
do, and obviously no Turing machine can be biological, QED AI is a 
delirious fantasy.  Or, historically, intelligence is a unique product 
of a unique world-history and evolutionary sequence, therefore no 
machine.... etc.
One last thing: tools aren't really a good test: they too are 
extensional: remember, intelligent beings can use tools, but so can mere 
mamals like anteaters and monkeys, and certain birds can even evolve 
their technology/tools.  So  a better test would be to try to test the 
capacity that allows tool use.

It's been entirely too long since I read 5HC; take my words with a grain 
of salt- preferably sea salt, better flavour.

Chris wrote:

> Well, with regard to 5HC note that if the idea that abos can't use 
> tools, then Veil's hypothesis seems hopelessly naive. Does Veil know 
> something (ie, that popular wisdom is wrong and abos can use tools) 
> that others do not? She did spend some time studying her subject. 
> Perhaps the second and third novellas are naive, based on a folktale 
> conception of the abos. If *that* were the case, then in all 
> likelihood V.R.T. is not an abo, but would like to imply that he is.
> With regard to Turing, what you just described is basically a semantic 
> struggle. Defining intelligence, as you say, "extensionally" (although 
> this really isn't quite right, I see what you're trying to say). "If 
> it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck..." To which Searle can 
> be seen volleying (again, mostly semantically): no, it doesn't matter 
> what it looks like, intelligence is the product of a specific 
> biological process and machines can't have it, by definition, no 
> matter what they do or "say". The part that any empirical test or 
> evidence plays in this debate is much smaller than it might appear. 
> The empirical test, of course, appears as a product of having already 
> accepted Turing's position.
> I think that ultimately the tool-using test you're talking about, if 
> implemented in a way that actually worked, would be more or less the 
> same as a standard test. Here you would have to be concerned with what 
> constitutes a "use" of a tool, and be able to quantify between more 
> and less intelligent uses for the tool, which involves 
> "imaginitiveness" and "logical potential". Not to mention that 
> sometimes it is more intelligent not to use a tool than to use it. 
> (And language is as good a tool as any...)
>> This doesn't actually have anything to do with the issue, but I've 
>> always thought the true subtlety of the Turing test usually
>> goes unappreciated: What the Turing Test asserts is that there is no 
>> way to perform all the operations of intelligence,
>> in any way simpler and more mechanical than actual intelligence.  
>> Intelligence is incompressible, if you will. Or, intelligence
>> is defined extensionally, not intentionally.
>> Oh wait, I've thought of a point: Tool-using is a skill. Not 
>> intelligence in and of itself.  So, when you test AI, do you ask it 
>> to use a
>> inclined plane, pully and other bric-a-brac to prove its 
>> intelligence, or do you test its imaginativeness and other logical 
>> potential?
>> ~Maru
>> James Wynn wrote:
>>>> I think in 1972 toolmaking was considered to be the defining
>>>> characteristic of Hom Sap. It was thought that tools cane first,
>>>> brains later. Not sure that that is still the case.
>>> Hmmmm...I hadn't thought of the possible point Wolfe may be making 
>>> about
>>> humanity and the ability to use tools. Is he asking whether the 
>>> Annese's
>>> inability to use tools prevents them from being human regardless of how
>>> closely they mimic us?
>>> Is Wolfe taking on the Turing requirements for Artificial 
>>> Intelligence [if a
>>> machine is convincingly human enough, then it is self-aware] and 
>>> applying
>>> them to Biology?

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